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CORPORATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE FCPA 
Albert L. Beswick* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
American corporations have learned to live reasonably with, 
if not actually love, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. 1 Congress 
is currently being told that there are things that need correcting 
in the Act. Congress will eventually face these problems rather 
seriously so that a bill in some form will amend some of the things 
wrong with the Act. It is doubtful that any business person of 
good faith thinks there is anything wrong with the theses behind 
the Act. Business has learned, to its benefit, to live with the re-
quirements of the Act. 
II. HOW CORPORATIONS COMPLY WITH THE FOREIGN 
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 
The only reliable way to make sure of compliance is to create 
what the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) enforcement 
staff and others have called a control atmosphere within the cor-
poration.2 There are many different ways that American corpora-
tions can do that. From my personal experience over the last 
seven years, here are a few ideas of how I think it is best to do this. 
The corporation is a legal figment. It does not really exist 
aside from physical assets, some money, hopefully, and its 
employees; from the executives down to the janitors. The top 
employees, i.e., the chief executive officers working with the 
board of directors, have to come, at some point, to terms with set-
ting up a system of corporate controls to carry out a policy of com-
pliance with the Act, which was made effective December 19, 
1977. If it was not done long before the effective date of the Act, a 
firm policy decision, at the very senior level, should be reached 
that the business must be governed by a few major principles. One 
principle is that in every area, in every country, where the cor-
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1. Foreign Corrupt Practices of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, §§ 102-104, 91 Stat. 1494 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78m, 78dd-l, 78dd-2, 78ff (Supp. V 1981)), reprinted in Appendix 
I, infra. 
2. See, e.g., Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977: A Transactional 
Analysis, 13 J. !NT'L L. & ECON. 367, 369 (1979). 
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poration operates, has sales or does business of any sort, a well-
defined and well-understood set of business ethics and principles 
should be followed, no matter what the U.S. or other law says. The 
second point is that, aside from good ethics as defined by the cor-
poration, it is important to know the relevant laws governing busi-
ness conduct, including, but certainly not limited to, the Act. Then 
a corporation must do its level best to fit its interpretation of 
those laws and ethical principles into every tough situation that 
comes up, and do what is within the law. This is not a moralistic 
viewpoint. This is business common sense, and if people do not 
think it is, they are deluding themselves and are going to come to 
very great grief in the near future. 
Most American corporations of size, and probably most that 
are not big, have not really deviated much from a good system of 
compliance with ethical principles. The horrid bribery disclosures 
of the 1975-76 era were aberrations, even in the context of that 
time. They were not a pattern of the American way of life, or of 
doing business abroad or in this country. To whatever extent a 
given corporation thought such practices were a good idea then, 
the United States government, press and public have made it 
perfectly obvious that at least American corporations are not go-
ing to be tolerated if they do business in a way that is nonethical 
or nonlegal. It is a matter of good, hard business common sense to 
create a control atmosphere. It will not be perfect because there 
will always be the proverbial bad apple who will not believe that a 
corporation is sincere, and who will think that it really wanted him 
to go out and make a sale using devious methods because "no one 
is really ethical." Since American industry hires some quirky peo-
ple, as well as perfectly lovable and normal people, occasionally 
there will be someone who will go off the deep end and do some-
thing reprehensible. The only way to explain that deviation to the 
Justice Department, the SEC or anyone else is to show you have a 
long history of an excellent control atmosphere, and a set of con-
trols, such as those hinted at in section 102 of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act. 
The only decent policy decision at the top level is that a cor-
poration must adhere to high ethical standards. A corporation 
must adhere to the law, or else it will lose its reputation. We are 
now living in the tenth year of the post-Watergate era. If a 
business does anything that is truly exciting to the press and the 
government, it will be of a serious, reprehensible nature. The 
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shareholders may not be interested in it. Competitors may not 
even be interested. But this is the very sort of thing that is even-
tually going to come out before the public. There is no type of im-
proper action that one can take which will not eventually come to 
light. Suppose a person who set up a corrupt deal is a known bad 
actor, who was being considered for termination. As things 
develop, it becomes more and more obvious that he has been doing 
something wrong. When it comes to the point of terminating him, 
what is this person going to do? ,He is going to attempt extortion. 
If you encouraged him in this, so much the worse. If he did it on 
his own, maybe you can explain it to someone. If you condoned it, 
you are setting yourself up for a great deal of grief. He has annui-
ty and cannot be fired. He may become a very expensive 
employee, depending upon what it was that was done, and how 
desirous the corporation is of not having anyone know about it. It 
simply makes no sense whatsoever to permit anyone to do 
business for a corporation in a way that would not stand the light 
of day on the front page of the better known newspapers. 
It is certainly material, as the SEC ·has said, to investors, 
customers, the government, and the public in general, that they be 
informed whether or not a given U.S. business' order input is ob-
tained through legitimate and straightforward methods, or 
whether it is extremely fragile and subject to termination or ex-
propriation because of the unethical way it was obtained. Some 
devious business dealings, should they occur, are things which 
have to be disclosed in the normal course of compliance with U.S. 
securities laws. Not every little peccadillo has to be disclosed. 
Many considerations determine whether a given deviation from a 
policy of law and ethics is material or not. 
III. DAMAGE CAUSED BY NONCOMPLIANCE 
What kind of damage is done by publicized unethical 
behavior? You lose business and you lose your most valuable 
asset, which is your corporate reputation. A great deal of the 
value of a corporation's shares has to do with what the investing 
public believes is your prospect for the future. And, if you lose 
your reputation for not having a reasonable amount of the expected 
ethical virtues, it is very difficult to recapture that reputation. 
And a good reputation is more valuable to a corporation than any 
large business deal. You can always make another deal, and, if 
necessary, close down a part of your business. 
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It is not an unusual situation for senior business executives to 
lose a piece of business. You can lose it because your product is 
not as competitive as someone else's, or your financing is not as 
good, or your service is not as convenient. Or in a foreign country, 
your agent is not as influential as a competitor's agent. Paren-
thetically, there is nothing wrong with having an influential agent. 
In fact, a corporation would be rather insane to hire noninfluential 
agents. There is nothing necessarily evil, reprehensible, or ques-
tionable about having agents. Indeed, in certain countries, you 
must have agents in order to do any business locally because of na-
tional statutory law. Also, of course, you want to comply with that 
law. 
On top of that, if a corporation violates the Act, the most ex-
citing thing is the penalty. The penalty can be a million dollar fine 
per violation. I believe that is equal to the largest penalty in the 
U.S. for any given type of criminal violation. A corrupt payment 
may be a thousand dollars; still there is a million dollar fine if the 
government thinks the case is worth prosecuting and it is proved. 
Also, five years in prison is provided for American executives who 
knowingly participate in bribery, whether based in Bahrein or 
somewhere in the United States. I am sure that sooner or later 
people will suffer these penalties. There are numerous cases pend-
ing for investigation now, and some of them will be worthy of pros-
ecution. So the penalties here are not inconsiderable. 
On top of loss of reputation, these stiff penalties are one thing 
that U.S. industrialists would just as soon do without. If there 
were a possibility of revising the Act, so the penalties were either 
reduced or removed completely, everyone in business would like it 
better. However, I do not think that is politically feasible at the 
present time, nor will it probably ever be. Business people must 
agree with the basic principle, which is: "Thou shalt not get 
business through bribery." 
As well, you have civil litigation. You have the very hyper-
active plaintiff bar waiting in the wings to have the government 
prove its case, and then file suit against you the next day with a 
shareholder's derivative action for many millions of dollars. Hiring 
your own lawyer to defend the suit is a cost that is not incon-
siderable. 
Even worse than that, of course, is the terrible annoyance and 
disruption of your own senior management being harrassed by 
depositions and the trial, if it reaches that point. There will be 
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competitor action; competitors will say: "Don't buy from them, 
they're in trouble." You'll get customer reaction. Finally, a judg-
ment may even have to be paid, on top of the fine. But, again, I 
think loss of corporate reputation is the most serious thing. This is 
not my view alone; I think reputation is commonly perceived as 
being very vital in the United States. Anything that imperils 
reputation is an unreasonable risk, no matter what the immediate 
gain is to be. 
What is necessary is a top-level decision of the chief executive 
on the question of what the corporate ethical standards will be and 
what the law-compliance posture will be. The corporation cannot 
stop there because the chief executive is not omnipresent; he is 
not in on everything. The board of directors meets once a month, 
presumably, and cannot know what is going on day to day, except 
that which is reported to it. For this reason, there must be com-
munication with people who are actually doing the business. And 
you have to communicate to reasonably low middle-management 
levels what your policy is. You cannot just give it to ten senior 
people. Then some training work is necessary to make sure that 
all managers understand how serious you are, that there aren't 
any "corrupt countries" where there are exceptions. It must be 
made clear to everyone from regular executives to marketing peo-
ple, especially to the lawyers, that you are really willing to forego 
business and not punish them if they forego an order, because 
they did not pay the price, a bribe. If you do all these necessary 
things, I think you will have a control atmosphere to enforce an 
adequate code of corporate conduct which ought to insure com-
pliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. 
It is sensible for American business to try to persuade the 
American government to press foreign governments and interna-
tional groups to require similar types of business ethics principles. 
Americans should not be taken advantage of by competitors 
abroad who are not playing by the same rules. It is very difficult 
to accuse a competitor of having got business by bribery. One 
might, possibly, in a given situation, have evidence. It is hard for 
the Department of Justice to find evidence of bribery, and very 
hard for competitors to find that evidence. And bribery by a com-
petitor is an easy way out for an incompetent or ineffectual 
marketing person to excuse a loss of a sale; just as it is very easy 
too for extortionate foreign parties to claim that you have to pay a 
bribe, which very often is not the case. You do not have to pay the 
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bribe, you just waste some corporate assets if you do so. Another 
point is that most every country in the world has a law against 
bribery, making it a crime. 
Some non-American industrialists may think that all I have 
said up to now about ethics is nonsense. But "men of the world," 
while they do not like to bribe, find bribery an unpleasant obliga-
tion under certain circumstances. They certainly never pay exces-
sive bribes, but only what is absolutely necessary to get business. 
These people perceive Americans as "Boy Scouts," and that is un-
fortunate, but we can live with that kind of opinion. It makes little 
difference whether your competitor is paying bribes or not. You 
will not know whether they are doing it, there is no way to prove 
it, and the fact that foreigners do not like our policy is simply un-
fortunate. Maybe we can nudge them in that direction over the 
text ten, twenty, or thirty years; it is probably going to be a slow 
process. Meanwhile, I do not think America will go under. I think 
we still have enough economic vitality in this country, and in other 
countries where we may have interests, so we can survive even 
bribery by competitors, where it might exist. 
IV. CODE OF CORPORATE CONDUCT 
The first duty of the chief executive officer is to see that the 
corporation adopts a code of corporate conduct specifying fairly 
precisely how various ethics and legal problems of doing business 
are going to be addressed. The code should consist of legal-type 
principles that managers, aided by lawyers and auditors, will be 
asked to enforce. The code of conduct should be presented to the 
board of directors, either all at once or in pieces, in order to obtain 
their concurrence in it, because some of them may otherwise feel 
it is costing business, whether or not they have information that 
could bring them to that conclusion. They read the news and they 
may get the idea that the loss of an order resulted from a failure 
to make an appropriate payment. 
The chief executive officer has to use whatever facilities are 
appropriate to establish mechanisms within the corporate entity 
to assure that the code is adhered to. Once a year, at the first 
general meeting, maybe more often, the chief executive can hand 
out the code as updated, to every one of the senior officers in at-
tendance at that meeting. It may be ten and it may be one hun-
dred people; whoever is in charge of each profit center should 
receive a copy of the corporate code. The chief executive should 
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personally say, "This code is mine, this is the board of directors', 
this is your 'law.' And I don't care what the statutes say, you 
adhere to this. And if you're not an American, don't get mad, the 
United States government did not force the ·export of its law. 
These are our principles, they at least come up to the level of U.S. 
law. They're seriously taken by us, they'd better be by you, or else 
you're out of a job." There should be filed, every year, a set of cer-
tifications from recipients which say, "I've got the code, I've read 
it, I've understood it, I've discussed it with my senior people 
reporting to me, they have told me they understand it and will 
adhere to it, and enforce it." 
For establishment of everyday corporate compliance mecha-
nisms, a corporation should take one or more lawyers within the 
organization, and place them in charge of interpreting the code, 
especially in light of the FCP A and the SEC requirements. They 
can help assure that proper auditing is done and that proper ac-
tions are taken with ' regard to controls, and with regard to check-
ing out, in a methodical basis, compliance with the code. The inter-
nal auditing staff could be approached, and one or more of the 
auditors could be assigned as compliance auditors, and be given 
the assignment of doing nothing but compliance auditing. These 
auditors should go into every unit, on a regular basis, and do an 
audit based upon the components of your code of conduct in order 
to detect deviations from it. The compliance auditors can be guid-
ed by management and lawyers, to help them discern what is 
material and what is not material. They learn pretty quickly how 
to do one of these audits. They can come up with an eighty-phase 
compliance audit grid rather quickly, which is a guide for auditing 
each subsidiary. 
There should be an active education program for all of your 
units, as well as for headquarters people, to explain the meaning, 
the purpose and, above all, the seriousness of your code of cor-
porate conduct. Staff departments and unit marketing should 
know the code, as should quasi-autonomous subsidiaries doing 
business in another country. There is, then, an educational prob-
lem of explaining what these policies mean in practice. The 
lawyers who are compliance officers should lecture on actual cases 
and explain how they were handled to correct deviations from the 
code. It should be possible, then, to illustrate in a concrete manner 
what your corporate code of conduct means. 
Though they are based in the audit department, the com-
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pliance auditors function for the compliance officers as the main 
source of compliance information. It is a good idea not to make the 
lawyers into detectives or auditors. They ought to spend their 
time on interpretation and advice to those at the management 
level. And if there are deviations from the code, the lawyers will 
have to decide what the legal consequences are, what existing cor-
porate controls, if any, were circumvented as well as the method 
of circumvention, what additional efforts, including additional con-
trols, are necessary to prevent a recurrence of the same type of 
violation, whether the deviations should or must be publicly 
reported, and what disciplinary action might be appropriately 
taken against a particular violator. The chief executive officer and 
the board of directors, or the legal affairs committee of the board 
of directors, should receive regular reports as to the status of the 
compliance program and any serious deviations. 
Furthermore, there is now a good rule of evidence as enun-
ciated by Mr. Justice Rehnquist in Upjohn Co. v. United States.3 
This opinion decided several important matters. It now appears 
that the regular and detailed inquiries by internal corporate 
lawyers into deviations from corporate policy that have criminal 
or civil overtones are not going to be discoverable by anyone, in-
sofar as they are embodied in a writing prepared by corporate 
counsel, for counsel, or to enable counsel to perform its function 
with regard to advising management. The Upjohn opinion resolved 
the legal issue whether information that is conveyed to legal 
counsel, at the counsel's request, by corporate employees other 
than the so-called "control group" (a very small group that has the 
authority to make or enforce corporate policy) is subject to the 
attorney-client privilege. The Court decided that if lower-level cor-
porate employees give information to counsel in writing, it is pro-
tected from discovery under the attorney-client privilege. And the 
control group test is now stone-cold dead. 
The only way you find out the detail of what is going on in a 
corporation is to ask numerous middle level and slightly higher 
level people. Counsel has to ask a middle level manager to recon-
3. In Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), a pharmaceutical company 
made questionable payments to foreign officials which were investigated internally by cor-
porate lawyers. The company submitted the information garnered from this investigation 
voluntarily to the SEC. The Internal Revenue Service URS) filed this suit to collect alleged 
past-due revenues based on those payments. The IRS attempted to use discovery to gain ac-
cess to the information of the Upjohn internal investigation. 
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struct what happened, or to assemble figures from here, there and 
the other place. Obviously, this rule does not in any way protect 
from discovery information that already exists and was not 
prepared by or for counsel to advise a client. There is no rule that 
if information is put into a memo to a lawyer, somehow magically it 
becomes sacrosanct and no one can look at it. Something that in-
dependently exists and was not prepared for the use of a lawyer 
to perform his professional functions does not obtain protection by 
conveying it to a lawyer. 
In any event, I think that corporate efforts to comply with the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, if handled by, and for the informa-
tion of counsel, are likely to be protected from disclosure to other 
litigating parties. So, there is no reason not to have a full and 
frank disclosure within the corporation, with the lawyers obtain-
ing information on possible code of conduct or FCP A violations for 
their professional purposes. 
V. CORPORATE CONDUCT AND THE ACCOUNTING 
AND BRIBERY PROVISIONS 
The accounting provisions are important, and they fit with 
the bribery provisions. If you account correctly for expenditures, 
it is likely to stop bribery, if it exists. If you do bribe, you had bet-
ter put in a "bribe" account, or some kind of account that ade-
quately reflects precisely what was done. And if you do not want 
to identify adequately an auditable account reflecting what you 
did, you had better not do it. 
I think American industry does properly object to the FCP A 
provision authorizing a prosecutor and a jury to decide you had 
"reason to know" what a third party was doing with your money. 
This allows a jury or prosecutor to indulge in second-guessing as 
to what you must have known about your agents, whether or not 
this has any relation with what you actually did know, or could 
reasonably have found out, about your agent's conduct. But I do 
not think this is anything to be disturbed about, if there is a pro-
per control atmosphere within the corporation. 
At one time the SEC and the Justice Department went to the 
extent of saying, "Well, we think you're probably liable for the 
bad conduct of your foreign joint venturer. We think you had bet-
ter monitor your joint venturer's actions for your own protection." 
It was also once assert~d that Americans were responsible for the 
conduct of their distributors, even if they were true distributors: 
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independent businessmen, buying from you, taking all risks of 
ownership, taking all credit risks, reselling, and clearly not an 
agent. The government once asserted that a company could be 
responsible if its distributor used corrupt methods to sell to 
ultimate users. But I do not think the government is now going to 
press these extreme FCP A theories. 
In a company in which a minority's interest is held, are you 
responsible for the good conduct of the majority? Assume you 
have a minority on the board. I think you are responsible for 
knowing what is going on within the company. If you own twenty 
percent or more, you should not take that investment position 
unless you have got someone on the board that can learn what is 
going on. And I think that you should make appropriate objections 
at the board level, if there are things you suspect are improprie-
ties or if the accounting is not up to American standards. I think 
you have got to do what you can to make sure that a joint venture 
in which you have an equal interest, or an entity in which you have 
a minority interest, is properly run. If it really disturbs you, you 
ought to sell out, because sooner or later you are probably going 
to have to anyway. 
VI. FEATURES OF A CODE OF CORPORATE CONDUCT 
Now what should be included in a code of corporate conduct? 
The existence of such a code, and its enforcement to the best of 
human ability, presents a reasonable argument that deviations 
from required conduct not done corruptly, and, in many cases, are 
not a proper subject for a prosecution. I believe each American 
corporation should have something like the International Tele-
phone and Telegraph Code of Corporate Conduct.4 
The first policy is on business practices, and it simply states 
that our policy is to adhere to high ethical and legal standards and 
to obey the laws everywhere. There are also references to sales 
and marketing representatives; five principles on accounting; and 
practice 1.01 that develops the theme of proper accounting for 
assets. These are the documents that should be handed out at 
least once a year. Everyone at a responsible management level 
should know them, adhere to them, and be in position to try to en-
force them with the help of accountants and lawyers. And the 
4. l.T.T. C ODE OF C ORP. C ON DUCT, Appendix Ill, infra. 
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standard practice simply says that you have to be sure of where 
your assets are going; you have to be sure that the stated purpose 
is the actual purpose for which you are spending your funds, and 
that the purpose as stated is the actual purpose, and that it con-
forms to your policy. 
This particular document, 1.01, provides that you have to 
have paper showing the authorized parties making the request for 
corporate money; approval by a person having authority to ap-
prove, and that the documents showing the purpose for which the 
expenditure was made are held permanently in the corporate 
records for the purpose of audit. Furthermore, it states that 
everything in excess of $50,000 to be expended for particular 
types of purposes, like public relations, advertising, security, proxy 
solicitation, printing, taxes, legal or consulting services must be 
personally approved by the chief executive. These are the chief 
categories in which questionable payments might be disguised. 
This provision in effect says: you have to take this proposed pay-
ment to the boss, and make your case to him, but if something is 
wrong with this payment, you not only stated that it was proper, 
but on top of that, you went to the chief executive and told him that 
is was proper. This is a fairly effective way of preventing people 
from requesting payments that are not proper. It puts two people 
on the line, the chief executive officer and the person requesting 
the payment. I think that deviations from accountability should, as 
the last paragraph of 1.01 states, be required to be made known to 
the chief executive officer. He is going to be responsible for this 
type of enforcement. 
Policies 2 and 3, I think, are a good idea because, if you have a 
control atmosphere, you do not want any kind of conflict of interest 
by your own employees. If you do not try to control conflict of in-
terest, you probably do not have a control atmosphere; you prob-
ably cannot be sure that your ethical conduct requirements are be-
ing observed in any other area, such as obtaining and retaining 
business. It is important to have your senior people certify annual-
ly as to their status regarding conflict of interest, to require them 
to present, if necessary, a negative report, "I have no conflict of in-
terest," and to require employees to report possible conflicts as 
they arise. I think it is important for you to make sure that your 
own corporate personnel do not accept gifts, gratuities or accom-
modations other than as expressly allowed by your policy. If you 
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are going to say, "Don't give other people gifts," and your people 
are in the habit of taking substantial gifts, it is very easy for them 
then to justify the giving of corporate funds. 
In policy 4, we forcefully bring to the attention of managers, 
in writing, that adherence to the key policies is a condition of 
working for the company, and that they lose their jobs if they are 
found later to have deviated from, or assisted in a deviation from, 
or not reported a deviation from, the ethical standards. You may 
not want to adopt a strict nonpartisan posture for the corporation. 
In many countries, a political contribution is perfectly legal on the 
part of corporations. It is easier and safer to say no. We have a 
firm policy against contributions, and it saves money to say no. 
The only exception to that would be a political action committee. If 
you want to have one, they are perfectly legitimate and allowed 
under American law. 
Policy 6 in the package is a detailed list of standards of cor-
porate conduct for your corporation's employees in their relations 
with government employees. I think it perfectly legitimate to offer 
the head of a ministry, w horn you are going to try to sell 
something to, an all-expense trip to the United States or to 
wherever your factory is located. However, this practice must be 
well-known to his superior, a common practice in his country, and 
for a business purpose. You must not let him stop over in some 
garden spot or supply him with a charge account in order to buy 
personal things at corporate expense. Just the hotel, food and 
transportation I think are quite legitimate, as long as it is perfectly 
well known to the superiors in his ministry. I do not think it is cor-
rupt and I do not think it is for his personal use. In many coun-
tries, governments expect this, they want the Americans to bear 
the cost of their doing business as a matter of public policy. 
Finally, policy 7 has in it the standards that ought to be 
observed whenever you use agents. The second item refers to a 
very detailed form of agreement, which the general counsel will 
have prepared, having all kinds of proper clauses in it whereby 
the agent agrees to do certain things and not to do certain things. 
The important principle is that there is nothing wrong with hiring 
a legitimate agent who is actually in business performing real ser-
vices that you can point to. There is nothing wrong with a well-
connected person who can speak for you, as long as you have no 
reason to know, or to believe, that he is passing along money or 
other gifts. 
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I do not think that the government has ever taken a contrary 
position. Agents per se are not suspect, and are specifically re-
quired in some countries. They should not be overcompensated for 
a great many good reasons. You should know who they are. You 
should have people in that country who can tell you what their 
reputation is before you hire them. You have to do your best to 
identify a good, reliable businessman who performs real services 
and who is adequately but not grossly compensated. You must 
have no reason to believe he is passing along money. Moreover, I 
think that compliance with policy number 7 will probably keep you 
out of trouble with the U.S. government and with any other gov-
ernment. 
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